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Georg Henrik von Wright was not only the first interpreter of Wittgenstein, arguing that 
Spengler’s work had reinforced and helped Wittgenstein to articulate his view of life, but he was 
also the first to consider seriously that Wittgenstein’s attitude towards his times makes him 
unique among the great philosophers, that the philosophical problems that Wittgenstein was 
struggling with, indeed his view of the very nature of philosophy, were somehow connected with 
“the way people live”, that is, with features of our culture and civilization. 
In this essay, I would like to manifest the inspiration and courage which I have drawn 
from von Wright’s insistence that trying to understand Wittgenstein in relation to his times is a 
philosophical task in its own right, not to be dismissed as either idle or irrelevant, in probing a 
relatively obscure region in Wittgenstein’s thought: his relation to the music of his times. It is a 
topic on which von Wright, and most other prominent Wittgenstein interpreters, have said very 
little, but it is also a subject, as Wittgenstein himself attested, “so important to him that he felt 
without it he was sure to be misunderstood” (Fann 1969, 67–68). The purpose of the present 
essay is to re-contextualize my recent study of Wittgenstein’s remarks on modern music (Guter 
2015) in Von Wright’s overarching outlook on Wittgenstein’s philosophy in relation to its time, 
thereby suggesting why and how these intriguing remarks are integral and conducive to an 
overall understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
It is very clear that in Wittgenstein’s mind music has always been intimately and 
irrevocably related to “the way people live”. It took some time for Wittgenstein to develop to the 
point where this idea became explicit in his writings. At any rate, it is in full bloom by his middle 
period, when we find him asking, “Could one reason be given at all, why the theory of harmony 
is the way it is? And, first and foremost, must such a reason be given?” and then answering, “It is 
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here and it is part of our entire life” (Wittgenstein, 2000, MS157a, 24–26; my translation, my 
emphasis). This notion is even more pronounced in his late period, in particular during his final 
breakthrough years (1946–1951), when he focused intensely on the idea that music is 
physiognomic, intransitively transparent to human life, drawing closely, as Garry Hagberg puts 
it, to “the preconditions, and the lived, embodied realities, of musical intelligibility” (Hagberg 
2011, 402). Indeed for Wittgenstein, music has always been a “master simile”, as it were, for 
anything which is fluid, non-mechanical, context-laden, incalculable, and indeterminate in 
language—first and foremost, expression. In Wittgenstein's later writings in particular, thinking 
about language as music became part and parcel of not only his multifarious considerations of 
meaning, understanding, and aspects, but also, and importantly so, his treatment of the 
experience of meaning. 
For the later Wittgenstein, a musical gesture is transparent in the sense that it is already 
given to us with a familiar physiognomy, already internally related to our world of thoughts and 
feelings. And so we find in Wittgenstein’s later writings the need to make sense of the conviction 
that “understanding music is a manifestation of human life” (1998, 80; compare 1953, 143 par. 
527), that it is a measuring rod by which a culture is to be gauged, enabled by our capacity to 
make increasingly nuanced comparisons between multiform human practices as we chart the 
unexpected topography of the resemblances that give unity to a culture’s ways of life. 
It is noteworthy that von Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein in relation to his times is 
emblematic of von Wright’s own approach to the idea of culture. Both philosophers approached 
the idea of culture by way of a critique of Western civilization, its scientific rationality and the 
latter’s repercussions on life—“a diagnosis of our times,” as von Wright called it (Wright 1993, 
3-4)—whose pessimistic overtones resonate in sympathy with Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the 
West (Spengler 1939). Wittgenstein found many real, significant thoughts in that book. He wrote: 
“Much, perhaps most of [Spengler’s Decline], is completely in touch with what I have often 
thought myself” (Wittgenstein 2003, 25; see Wittgenstein 1998, 16). Von Wright’s interest in 
Spengler’s philosophical ideas spanned much of his career. He wrote: “It is […] a great pity that 
the prophet and quasi-historian Spengler overshadowed the philosopher Spengler that few people 
seem aware of the fruitfulness and relevance of his philosophic thoughts” (Wright 1989, 844). 
Significantly, the influence of Spengler oriented both philosophers toward allying the 
idea of culture with human nature, albeit without reducing cultural modes of existence to natural 
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ones. This essentially Romantic idea means that the human spirit, unspoiled by an excessively 
sophisticated, contrived tinkering of the human intellect, can be seen as a natural force of life, 
which promotes the creation and observance of shared human practices and customs that are 
deeply meaningful to us. Von Wright saw this idea as the very essence of humanism: “Man has a 
‘nature’, characteristic of man as man, and it is his inalienable right and profoundest destiny to 
try in life to actualize this nature as fully as possible” (quoted in Tranøy 1989, 495). This is 
accomplished through the acquisition of skills, habit, tendencies, and preferences, which enable 
us to observe a way of life, develop an aesthetic taste or a religious attitude. Thus, the vitality of 
a culture, its cohesion and strength as a spiritual force in our lives, hinges upon the significance 
of such uncontrived cultural sensibilities and skills to our observance of a way of life. This is a 
cause for lamentation about the deterioration of culture, the loss of its vitality, for both 
Wittgenstein and von Wright, but also an occasion for instigating a critical task concerning the 
idea of progress, which we find explicitly in von Wright’s writings, but also, as I suggest below, 
in Wittgenstein’s remarks on modern music, albeit implicitly.  
Von Wright pointed out that Wittgenstein cannot be bundled in any straightforward way 
with what we are in the habit of calling “conservatism”: “Wittgenstein was much more anxious 
to combat and distance himself from a prevailing climate of opinion than to work for the 
restoration of one which was already fading. He is as little nostalgic in his thinking as are 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche” (Wright 1990, 52–53). His attitude is exactly the opposite of that of 
the man who seeks to preserve what is or even to restore what no longer is. He believed in 
neither a brilliant future nor the good old days. Yet “the philosopher who wrote ‘I destroy, I 
destroy, I destroy’”, said von Wright, “was not alien to the thought that something new could be 
built once the heap of rubble of a decaying culture had been cleared away” (1990, 53). His is an 
attitude opposed no less to the conservative outlook than that of the progressives of the usual 
kind. 
I would like to pursue this more nuanced, subtle mode of reading Wittgenstein when 
considering his remarks on music. That is, I would like to resist the temptation to underscore 
Wittgenstein’s notoriously conservative taste in music, and even to extrapolate theoretically from 
it (see, for example, Szabados 2014). At the same time, I would like also to resist the temptation 
to reprimand him for it, thereby suggesting that his philosophy actually calls out modern music 
(see, for example, Hagberg 2011). 
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Wittgenstein’s impatience with the modern music of his time is well documented. He 
suggested that Gustav Mahler’s symphonies might be worthless and pondered whether the 
composer should have burned them or else “done himself violence” (Wittgenstein 1998, 76); he 
thought Alban Berg’s music scandalous (McGuinness 1988, 33); and he refused to enter a 
concert hall to attend a performance of selections from Richard Strauss’s Salome (McGuinness 
1988, 124).  David Pinsent, Wittgenstein’s friend and companion during his first sojourn in 
Cambridge in the years 1912–1913, noted in his diary the vehement arguments between 
Wittgenstein and his fellow students in Cambridge concerning modern music (Monk 1990, 78). 
Finally, in a sketch for a foreword to a planned book entitled Philosophical Remarks, 
Wittgenstein admitted that he approaches “what is called modern music with the greatest 
mistrust (without understanding its language)” (1998, 8).  
Such an attitude may certainly leave one somewhat frustrated, searching for where and 
why this great mind could have gone so wrong in this regard. But this response actually borders 
on some sort of ad hominem fallacy. In the last analysis, the real, indeed much more interesting 
question before us is not, “What music ought Wittgenstein have appreciated given the kinds of 
philosophical ideas he maintained at a given stage in his career?” but, rather, “What were his 
philosophical reasons and purpose for delineating musical experience in the way he did?” The 
first question presupposes too much: that there is no point in raising the other question. But this 
is unwarranted as it stands. So the other question deserves a fair shot. Actually, it is far more 
reasonable to expect that Wittgenstein will offer interesting reasons for taking the stance he did. 
To fully understand Wittgenstein’s critical attitude towards the modern music of his time, 
we need to consider as a starting point a relatively obscure episode: Wittgenstein’s brief 
encounter with the music theory of Heinrich Schenker, Spengler’s comrade-in-arms in 
musicology (Almén 1996). It occurred approximately between 1930 and 1933, in parallel with 
his encounter with Spengler’s work (Guter 2004, 2011, and 2015). Schenker’s theory was 
introduced to Wittgenstein in conversations with his nephew, the musicologist Felix Salzer, and 
there are a number of references to his ideas in the writings and lectures of Wittgenstein’s middle 
period.  
Schenker provided a formidable theory of musical decline. According to Schenker, all 
works of music (in particular all masterworks) are, in a sense, extended commentaries on the 
major triad, which Schenker dubbed “the chord of nature”. Schenker’s theory embodies an 
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attempt to describe musical thinking itself: it describes how we keep this “privileged formation” 
in mind over a period of time and how we interpret configurations of notes as contributing to the 
continuity of that cognition. Any musical work that digresses from the common practice of 
harmony (hence failing to demonstrate the kind of hierarchy sought out by Schenkerian analysis) 
is patently rejected by Schenker as unsuccessful, superficial, or altogether musically nonsensical 
depending on the severity of the digression. Irreverence towards the laws of tonal effect, among 
performers and composers alike, reflected, so he believed, a loss of musical instinct for the inner 
complexities of the masterworks of Western music, which in turn hindered the musician’s almost 
sacred mission to provide access to the world of human experience contained in such 
masterworks (Snarrenberg 1997, 145–150). 
In the most important reference to Schenker, which occurs in the Big Typescript, 
Wittgenstein actually fuses his critique of Spengler’s dogmatic use of the idea of an Urbild with 
Schenker’s analogous theoretical dogmatism concerning the idea of an Ursatz (Wittgenstein 
2005, 204; 2000, TS 213, 259v). The upshot of this twofold critique is a willingness by 
Wittgenstein to entertain Schenker’s view of music as a useful heuristic device that can be laid 
alongside the musical instances under consideration as a measure, rendering them surveyable, 
“not as a preconception to which everything must conform” (Wittgenstein 1998, 30). 
It is worthwhile to say a few words in this context about the relation between Schenker’s 
theory and the conservative views of an older Viennese music critic, Eduard Hanslick. A 
connection between Hanslick’s musical formalism and Wittgenstein’s remarks on music—in 
particular those penned earlier in his philosophical development—has been suggested by Hanne 
Appelqvist (née Ahonen) and subsequently also by Béla Szabados (Ahonen 2005; Appelqvist 
2008, 2010; Szabados 2006, 2014). Hanslick’s point in On the Musically Beautiful is that the 
objective properties of music, rather than people’s subjective responses to it, constitute the 
proper concern of musical aesthetics, which Hanslick rendered as a science (1986, 33). 
Appelqvist maintains that Hanslick’s musical formalism should be seen as a view that treats the 
mastery of musical rules as a criterion of musical understanding—a view which accords with 
Wittgenstein’s position, both early and late. Szabados maintains that Hanslick actually put forth 
an essentialist theory about the properties and value of music, which renders the early 
Wittgenstein, but not the late (post-Tractatus), as a musical formalist of sorts. As things stand, 
the exact nature of Hanslick’s formalism remains a matter of some scholarly controversy. As 
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Nicholas Cook admits, it is “one of the ubiquitously misunderstood concepts in the literature of 
music” (2007, 50). This impinges on the status of the Hanslick-Wittgenstein conjecture, which as 
a matter of fact enjoys no direct, unequivocal textual support in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass or 
letters. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that Schenker’s theorizing owes much to the basic conceptual 
framework of Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful. While Schenker gradually distanced 
himself from Hanslick’s positivist agenda, he shared Hanslick’s view of the compositional 
process and its importance for the understanding of music, and also Hanslick’s approach to 
emotional expression in music—that it must be understood in terms of the music’s objective 
properties. Schenker’s assertion that “the theory of harmony presents itself to me as a purely 
spiritual universe, a system of ideally moving forces, born of Nature or of art” (1954, xxv) 
distinctly echoes Hanslick’s formalism (compare Hanslick 1986, 151). According to Cook, 
“Schenker's theories as a whole can be seen as attempting to supply the explanations and 
demonstrations that Hanslick had called for in [On the Musically Beautiful], and to make visible 
the connections between musical elements to which Hanslick referred” (1989, 420; see 2007, 48-
62).  
Yet how should we relate Wittgenstein’s direct, even if succinct responses to Schenker’s 
theory to the proposed Hanslick-Wittgenstein conjecture? While I cannot do justice here to the 
complexity of this issue, I would like to make the following suggestions. First, regarding the 
historical facts. Felix Salzer reported that Wittgenstein’s judgment of Schenker’s view of music 
“was not entirely negative” (Guter 2004, 194). That in itself would make a rather bland reaction 
from one who is presumed to be a Hanslickian musical formalist. It is more probable that 
Wittgenstein’s susceptibility to Schenker’s theory had much more to do with Wittgenstein’s 
pronounced, well-documented interest in Spengler’s mode of thinking, as I pointed out above, 
than with some earlier exposure to Hanslick’s view of music. 
Second, regarding Wittgenstein’s actual remarks on Schenker. Wittgenstein’s implied 
critique of Schenker’s theory in the Big Typescript is clearly directed against its presumed 
essentialism. This is in line with Wittgenstein’s general approach to the very idea of ‘prototype’ 
(Urbild), which he found in Goethe’s morphological method. Wittgenstein denied the status of 
primal phenomena as common ancestors to all species (in any developmental, historical, or 
genetic sense) and restricted the notion of Urbild to a mere regulative idea, the primacy of which 
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is due to its heuristic use in providing the “logical space” for all possible relevant instances 
(Guter 2015). This made Wittgenstein highly critical of dogmatic (namely, essentialist, 
metaphysical, and illusory, in Wittgenstein’s eyes) uses of ‘prototypes’, such as Schenker’s 
Ursatz. Jettisoning the notion of formalism as essentialism, Wittgenstein’s preference to render 
Schenker’s view of music as a useful heuristic device that can be laid alongside the musical 
instances under consideration as a measure seems to preserve Appelqvist’s overarching emphasis 
on the mastery of musical rules as a criterion for musical understanding. Yet for Wittgenstein, 
“considering the piece in Schenker’s way” is only one possible criterion for musical 
understanding alongside other natural reactions which enable one to distinguish between 
someone who hears with understanding and someone who merely hears (2000, MS 153b, 60v-
61r). This very inclusion actually goes against Schenker’s formalist conviction that structural 
hearing of the sort promoted by his theory is the prime—if not the sole proper—manifestation of 
musical understanding. 
In the remainder of this essay I suggest that Wittgenstein’s criteria for musical 
understanding are significantly broader, heterogenous and dynamic than this, and furthermore, 
that Wittgenstein actually transcended Schenker’s formalist framework by critically entertaining 
the striking philosophical possibility of good modern music. It is precisely in these 
philosophically decisive moments that I see connections between Wittgenstein and von Wright. 
Wittgenstein’s most direct expression of his view of modern music occurs in a curious 
diary entry from January 27, 1931. It discloses the complexity of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards 
what von Wright later dubbed “the myth of progress”. I will use some of von Wright’s ideas in 
order to elucidate and amplify my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s view. In this diary entry 
Wittgenstein wrote: 
 
The music of all periods [the music of the past] always appropriates certain 
maxims of the good and the right of its own time. In this way we recognize the 
principles of Keller in Brahms etc etc. And for that reason [good] music, which is 
being conceived today or that has been conceived recently, which is therefore 
modern, seems absurd; for if it corresponds to any of the maxims that are 
articulated today, then it must be rubbish. This sentence is not easy to understand 
but it is so: no one is astute enough to formulate today what is correct, and all 
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formulations, maxims, which are articulated are nonsense [Unsinn]. The truth 
would sound entirely paradoxical to all people. And the composer who feels this 
within him must confront with this feeling everything that is [now] articulated and 
therefore [his music] must appear by the present standards absurd, timid 
[blödsinnig]. But not absurd in a dressed-up sense (for after all, this is basically 
what corresponds to the present attitude) but vacuous [Nichtssagend]. Labor is an 
example of this where he created something really significant as in some few 
pieces. (Wittgenstein 1999, 38; translated by Eran Guter and Nimrod Reitman) 
 
Wittgenstein begins his diary entry with a certain idea of cultural cohesion: music shows an 
affinity with other human practices and cultural artifacts of its period. The recognition, for 
example, of the principles of the Swiss author Gottfried Keller in the music of Johannes Brahms 
is familiar from Wittgenstein’s various lectures on aesthetics in the 1930s. The example clearly 
pertains to the cultural conditions for musical understanding and intelligibility, but also to the 
deepening of Wittgenstein's philosophical use of as- and aspect-phrasing —his careful attention 
to the activity of characterization and to the varieties of techniques of making illuminating 
comparisons to draw in significance, to become acquainted with something (see Floyd, 
forthcoming).  
According to Wittgenstein, we draw such similarities between the style of composer and 
the style of a poet or a painter who lived at the same time so that we can hear the composer’s 
music with understanding (Wittgenstein 2016, 6a 9:31). The point of drawing such similarities 
for such a purpose is precisely that the two artists belonged to and shared the same culture 
(Wittgenstein 1966, 32 n.). For Wittgenstein, the hidden connection, which is suggested by the 
pairing of Brahms and Keller, cannot be asserted independently of the actual hearing or playing 
of Brahms’s music with the understanding that such a pairing brings about (Wittgenstein 1967, 
166). Understanding the music of Brahms may consist in finding a form of verbal expression 
which we conceive as the verbal counterpoint of the music (for example, “Brahms is like Keller” 
or “find Keller in Brahms!”). However, Wittgenstein’s point is that “what happened when the 
understanding came was that I found the word which seemed to sum it up” (1967, 167; compare 
1998, 59–60).  
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It is instructive to see that Wittgenstein actually had a notion of an ideal of progress in the 
arts, which goes beyond the classic idea, which von Wright pointed out in his essay on “The 
Myth of Progress” (Wright 1993, 202–228), that progress in the arts amounts to liberation from 
the constraints imposed by serving the purpose either of entertaining the public or glorifying the 
powerful. Wittgenstein conceded this conventional notion, of course, but he evidently also 
thought that progress in the arts consists in a movement towards the perfection of man, an ideal 
which von Wright attributes chiefly to the sphere of morality. For the later Wittgenstein, ethics 
and aesthetics may not be one and the same, yet nonetheless each exhibits a distinct quest for that 
“reaction in which people are in touch with one another [sich finden]” (Wittgenstein 1980, 154 
par. 874), for being “mutually attuned top to bottom”, to use Stanley Cavell’s phrase (Cavell 
1982, 32). 
Crucially, Wittgenstein’s notion of progress in the arts exhibits a unique stance 
transcending the progressive/conservative divide, which von Wright observed in general. It is 
clearly not merely nostalgic, pessimistic, and conservative, as we can see in a related passage on 
the music of the future, again drawn from a diary entry, which Wittgenstein penned just a few 
months earlier. There we see Wittgenstein reiterating the ideal of human perfection in music in 
terms of simplicity, transparency, and nakedness: 
 
I shouldn’t be surprised if the music of the future were in unison [einstimmig]. Or 
is that only because I cannot clearly imagine several voices? Anyway, I can’t 
imagine that the old large forms (string quartet, symphony, oratorio, etc.) will be 
able to play any role at all. If something comes it will have to be—I think—
simple, transparent. In a certain sense, naked. Or will this apply only to a certain 
race, only to one kind of music (?) (2003, 49) 
 
However, for Wittgenstein, the music of the future is patently not modern music, not music of 
the present day, and his idea strongly envisions the beginning of a new cultural epoch (compare 
Wittgenstein 1998, 73). The influence of Spengler’s Decline of the West is unmistakable. For 
Spengler, the future always transcends the current epoch and it is always marked by a return to 
the simplest, most basic expression of life. Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the music of the future 
might not be a continuation of the currently predominant, culturally entrenched musical formats, 
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which embody a complexity of voices, can be related to various passages in Spengler. As 
Jacques Bouveresse pointed out, it would be “a gross exaggeration to say that Wittgenstein did 
not believe in the possibility of improving things. What is true is simply that he did not believe in 
the possibility of improving through continuing development in the current direction” 
(Bouveresse 2011, 310). 
The sort of cultural cohesion, exemplified by our intransitive understanding of Keller in 
Brahms, wherein music interacts with “the rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feeling” 
(Wittgenstein 1998, 59–60), is precisely what seems to have been lost, in Wittgenstein’s view, in 
the transition to the modern. For Wittgenstein, understanding is intransitive, if what I understand 
(in a picture or in a melody) cannot be translated into a different expression. In that sense, it is 
autonomous. For Wittgenstein, understanding a melody is a prime example of intransitive 
understanding (1974, 79). Modern music, that is, music which is being conceived amid “a 
dissolution of the resemblances which unite a [culture’s] ways of life” (Wright 1982, 116–117), 
is bound to seem deficient or absurd, according to Wittgenstein.  
It is crucial to carefully delineate the absurdity, or rather absurdities, involved here. At 
the heart of this diary entry we find Wittgenstein’s conviction that the transition to the modern 
shows itself in some sort of constraint—the inability to conceptualize a transition away from the 
kind of cultural cohesion epitomized by the “Keller-in-Brahms” example. There is something to 
be grasped, for sure, but, Wittgenstein maintains, we are not astute enough to conceptualize it. 
The kind of cleverness which we seem to lack, according to Wittgenstein, is a matter not of 
mental capacity but rather of education and tradition—an acquired ability to comprehend cultural 
codes (compare Wittgenstein 1966, 25–26). We have become constrained by an 
incommensurability between ourselves and the past, hence we arrive at a paradox: even if we 
knew the “truth”, we probably would be unable to comprehend it. Wittgenstein’s irony is glaring 
when he writes that “the truth would sound entirely paradoxical to all people”.  
For Wittgenstein, this condition produces a bifurcation and a conceptual tension in 
modern music, and results in two sorts of music which correspond to two sorts of cultural 
absurdity. There is music which consists in a constraint on seeing that we do not comprehend 
(and is hence unsinnig, or nonsensical), and there is another sort of music which consists in a 
constraint on seeing what we do not comprehend, on seeing through (and hence is blödsinnig, or 
timid, diffident).  
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The first sort of modern music corresponds, according to Wittgenstein, to the nonsensical 
maxims and formulations which are actually articulated in contemporary (Western) life. Most 
probably, Wittgenstein refers here to the predominant maxims of scientific-technological 
progress, for which he had the deepest mistrust, and not just because of its impact on the 
disappearance of the arts (Wittgenstein 1998, 8, 64). As von Wright pointed out, the hallmark of 
the great confusion about the nature of progress is “a tendency to transform questions of the 
value of ends into questions of the value of means (to those ends)” (Wright 1993, 217). Such was 
indeed the case with those who, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, claimed to 
emancipate dissonance in the name of progress, as if there were absolute, natural, necessary 
value in a relentless tinkering with harmony. Wittgenstein clearly had no patience for their 
senseless musical gesticulations, which Schenker’s theory explains as being symptomatic of 
these composers’ inability to bind their empty sonorities together as elaborations of a single 
chord. Thus, for example, Schenker accused Richard Strauss of trying to mask the primitive 
design of his music with heavy orchestration, with noise and polyphonic clatter, and of resorting 
to vulgar, extramusical narratives in order to solve problems of musical continuity. For both 
Schenker and Wittgenstein, such progressive music was plain “rubbish,” that is, something 
which, insofar as it presents itself as nonmusical clatter, is not interesting even from a merely 
technical perspective—indeed an “attractive absurdity” for all the wrong reasons. 
The other kind of modern music consists in denouncing such nonsensical maxims and 
formulations, but it ends up being vacuous, or vacant—absurd, for sure, but only because it 
cannot pass as absurd in the other, “dressed-up” sense which enjoys some sort of social 
acceptance. Such vacuous modern music bespeaks shortsightedness. It gropes for something that 
it cannot express. This is the genuine, albeit limited—in a sense, myopic—significance which 
Wittgenstein attached in this diary entry to some of the works of the blind organist Josef Labor, 
who was a protégé of the Wittgenstein family.  
The example of Labor—whose modest bust still stands quite unnoticed across the street 
from the Konzerthaus Wien, a solemn witness to fame long since passed—portrays the 
problematic, somewhat tragic situation of a composer who shuns the illusion and perils of 
progress and yet is patently barred from artistic greatness. Wittgenstein’s conception of vacuous 
modern music corresponds both to Spengler’s worry that when a culture enters its final phases 
(civilization), artists simply work with the hollow forms of the old culture without understanding 
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its essence, and to Schenker’s analogous worry concerning the compositional practice of 
classicist epigones. For Wittgenstein, ideas, including musical ideas, can get worn out and be no 
longer usable. In fact, he heard this from Labor himself (Wittgenstein 1998, 24).  
For Wittgenstein, vacuous modern music is the product of reproductive artists; it is first 
and foremost evidence of a lack of genius, hence a lack of character and of courage (43–44). The 
adjective “timid” (blödsinnig), which Wittgenstein used to characterize such music-making, 
captures this precisely. “In these times”, Wittgenstein wrote, “strong characters simply turn away 
from the field of the arts & towards other things” (8). The opposition of such a composer to the 
predominant contemporary maxims is commendable, but it is ultimately flaccid; it lacks 
“connection with life & death” (44; compare 43). And it exacts a heavy social price: as modern, 
it is bound to appear stupid.  
In the final analysis, Wittgenstein rejected both the conservative composer’s noble yet 
vacuous rehash of old forms and the progressive composer’s base contrapuntal tinkering with 
harmony, considering each to be symptomatic of musical decline. In this, his stance resonates 
with Schenker’s analogous distinction between the compositional fallacies accepted by the 
progressive and the reactionary composers of his time. 
Yet Wittgenstein’s text, significantly, does not give in to a false dichotomy between the 
merely bad and the vacuous. As we have seen, the 1931 diary entry begins by asserting what 
“good music” means in the present context: good music is good by virtue of its being emblematic 
of its time, as demonstrated in its affinity with other human practices and cultural artifacts of its 
period, and the intransitive understanding which ensues from it. It ends by pointing out the 
significance of at least certain forms of vacuous modern music: such music may embody an 
awareness of our built-in contemporary inability to conceive modern music that is good in that 
particular sense.  
Thus there is yet another kind of modern music to be entertained—good modern music—
and a corresponding absurdity of a very different sort. For Wittgenstein, good modern music is, 
paradoxically, the philosophical afterimage, as it were, of what would perhaps forever remain as 
that which has not yet been gained: a modern music which is courageous (rather than being 
merely outrageous or timorous) in its striving to penetrate through what appears to be the 
dissolution of the resemblances which unite this culture’s ways of life, by rendering this 
condition expressible and intransitively understandable. 
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Wittgenstein’s genuine worry that “no one is astute enough to formulate today what is 
correct” resounds strongly with Spengler’s similar worry that the philosophers of his day did not 
have any real standing in actual life, that they had not acquired the necessary reflective 
understanding of the time or its many built-in limitations, which philosophizing in a time of 
civilization requires (Spengler 1939, 42, vol. 1). Wittgenstein’s point about composers of his day 
is that given that no principle can coherently be articulated amid the dissolution of the 
resemblances that give unity to a culture’s ways of life, music that could express the inarticulate 
would be patently incomprehensible. 
The idea of good modern music, that is, music which is truly adequate to its time, the 
time of civilization in Spengler’s sense, is thus patently problematic for Wittgenstein. As an 
artistic project, such music needs to consist in an artistic afterimage of a wholesale rejection of 
the internal relations which hold together musical gesture and human life. Yet from 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical view, from his view of life, one can neither permit nor deny such an 
afterimage. And indeed we find Wittgenstein uneasily steering between Scylla and Charybdis in 
his complex remarks on the music of Gustav Mahler, the only quintessentially modern composer 
who was apparently significant enough in Wittgenstein’s eyes to be worthy of attention. 
Needless to say, Wittgenstein did not like Mahler’s music, yet he nonetheless attached 
deep philosophical significance to his art. Taste had nothing to do with this. “If [a symphony by 
Mahler] is a work of art”, Wittgenstein wrote, “it is one of a totally different sort. (But this 
observation itself is actually Spenglerian.)” (Wittgenstein 1998, 17). Mahler’s music clearly did 
not belong to the category of “vacuous modern music”, as did Josef Labor’s. Nor did it simply 
belong to the category of “bad modern music”, together with the compositions of Richard 
Strauss and Max Reger. Strikingly, Mahler’s music also did not belong to “the music of the 
future” in Wittgenstein’s sense.  
In a diary entry, which bears Schenker’s influence, Wittgenstein wrote:  
 
When for a change the later ones of the great composers write in simple [variant: 
clear] harmonic progressions [variant: relations], they show allegiance to their 
ancestral mother. Especially in these moments (where the others are most 
moving) Mahler seems especially unbearable to me & I always want to say then: 
but you have only heard this from the others, that isn’t (really) yours. (2003, 93) 
14 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, there is no genuine transparency or nakedness even in Mahler’s simple modes 
of expression. Rather, for Wittgenstein, Mahler was a riddle, a limit case in the history of 
Western music. “You would need to know a good deal about music, its history and development, 
to understand him,” he said (Rhees 1984, 71). Mahler exemplifies in Wittgenstein's eyes a grand 
failure to produce music which is adequate to the time of civilization. He reprimanded Mahler 
for his lack of courage to become what he could and perhaps should have been. With regard to 
Mahler's ultimate fault, Wittgenstein wrote: 
 
Whoever is unwilling to know himself is writing a kind of deceit. Whoever is 
unwilling to plunge into himself, because it is too painful, naturally remains with 
his writing on the surface. (Whoever wants only the next best thing, can achieve 
only the surrogate of a good thing.) (2000, MS 120, 72v [1937]; my translation)   
 
Yet here Wittgenstein faced, precisely, the problem of the incommensurability of values, which 
he had already introduced in the 1931 diary entry on modern music. The immediate charge of 
self-deception leads to a pronouncement of an acute problem: the inability to distinguish what is 
genuine (“valuable”) from what is false (“worthless”). This problem, which (Wittgenstein fears) 
afflicts his own thinking and writing as well, pertains to the cultural presuppositions for making 
such a distinction in the first place.  
In a passage written only three years before he died, Wittgenstein linked his own 
predicament with that of Mahler. He wrote: “If today’s circumstances are really so different, 
from what they once were, that you cannot compare your work with earlier works in respect of 
its genre, then you equally cannot compare its value with that of the other work. I myself am 
constantly making the mistake under discussion” (1998, 77). Ultimately, the specter of good 
modern music arises due to our inability to tell, as Yuval Lurie has aptly put it, “whether the 
spiritual progression of our culture is still continuing (and it is us who are being left behind), or 
whether the culture has disappeared (and we are the only ones left to notice it)” (2012, 150). 
Von Wright reminds us that “Wittgenstein is much more deeply ‘history-conscious’ than 
is commonly recognized and understood. His way of seeing philosophy was not an attempt to tell 
us what philosophy, once and for all, is but expressed what for him, in the setting of his times, it 
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had to be” (Wright 1982, 119). Music had an ulterior importance for Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical thinking. His own admission concerning this behooves one to attend carefully to 
his remarks on music in their philosophically appropriate context—to look and see. In this essay, 
I have offered one possible way to understand this ulterior importance of music for Wittgenstein 
as a key to his attempt to come to terms with what philosophy, in the setting of his times, had to 
be for him—that in Wittgenstein’s mind, the problem of creating good modern music and the 
problem of philosophizing in the time of modernity were one and the same. And so are the 
respective struggles with the contemporary obfuscation of the nature of progress—the critical 
task, which von Wright pitched so powerfully in his own philosophy.  
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